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ARTICLE: MISPLACED FEAR, HOW PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION WILL NOT
CRUMBLE IN THE FACE OF COMPELLING DISCOVERY UNDER § 1782(A)
By
Keenan Rambo*
I. INTRODUCTION
Expeditious proceedings and low costs provide the foundations of the international
arbitral process.1 However, lower costs regarding the discovery process in international
arbitration have become a hotly debated issue over the last two decades. Despite the desire
of United States courts to stay out of the arbitral process to avoid creating the delays seen
in the United States judicial system, the need for court involvement in private international
arbitration is becoming an unavoidable necessity.2
This article explores the reasons why parties engaged in private international
arbitration should be permitted to compel discovery in district courts through the use of 28
U.S.C. § 1782(a).3 Section 1782(a) permits a district court to compel a party who resides
within its jurisdiction to produce documents to be used in “a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal” after “the application of any interested person.”4 Given the recent
decisions by the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, it is unclear
whether 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) encompasses arbitral panels and organizations within its
meaning.5 The first section of this article provides a brief background on the history,
current dispute, and potential outcomes of a decision in favor of and against allowing 28
U.S.C. § 1782(a) to compel discovery. The second section provides background to explain
the appellate court decisions and how the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. furthered the argument on both sides.6 The third and final
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1. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS: MAKING AND DOING DEALS 38-39
(5th ed. 2018) (noting that businesses involved in arbitration are fond of the process because it “represents .
. . [an] expeditious way for resolving their disputes.”).
2. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU & HENRY ALLEN BLAIR, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND
PRACTICE, 13 (8th ed. 2019) (“The federal decisional law seeks to maintain the systemic autonomy of
arbitration[] . . . . The aggressive judicial protection of arbitration is meant to eliminate dilatory tactics.”).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2020).
4. Id.
5. See Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2020); Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co.
v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings), 939 F.3d 710, 71923 (6th Cir. 2019); contra Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 2020); Hanwei
Guo v. Deutsche Bank Sec., 965 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 2020).
6. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004) (“‘[t]he term
“tribunal” . . . includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial
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section of this article will present an analysis on why Section 1782(a) should be available
for foreign arbitration tribunals and parties. This final section discusses how Section
1782(a) encompasses private international arbitration, why differing discovery processes
between domestic and international arbitration are irrelevant, and how reading Section
1782(a) in this fashion aligns with Congress's and the Supreme Court’s national policy.
II. BACKGROUND: THE PURPOSE, CONTROVERSY,
DECISIONS FOR AND AGAINST SECTION 1782(A)

AND

POTENTIAL OUTCOMES

OF

Section 1782(a) allows a district court to order a party within its jurisdiction to
produce documents after receiving a request from an interested party. 7 Congress first
enacted Section 1782(a) in 1948 in an attempt to aid transnational proceedings.8 The last
fundamental change to Section 1782(a) occurred in 1964 when Congress adopted the broad
language “proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”9
Congress adopting this new phrasing has served to cause confusion and
disagreement among the Courts of Appeal.10 The disagreement stems from different
interpretations of statutory history and whether Congress intended for the phrase “foreign
or international tribunals” to encompass arbitration panels as “tribunals.”11The Second,
Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted several different rationales to
explain why Section 1782(a) should not encompass arbitration panels. The first argument
posed by these appellate courts is that statutory interpretation does not support including
arbitration within the term “tribunal.”12 The second argument raised is that Congress would

agencies . . . .’”) (quoting Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 1015, 1026-27 (1965))) [hereinafter Smit, International Litigation].
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2020).
8. See generally, Hagit Muriel Elul & Rebeca E. Mosquera, 28 U.S.C. Section 1782: U.S. Discovery in Aid
of International Arbitration Proceedings, in International Arbitration in the United States 393, 394-395
(2017).
9. See Sec. 9(a), § 1782, 78 Stat. at 997. It should also be noted that Congress did make minor changes to
28 U.S.C. § 1782 in 1996, however, these changes only added clarification that the statute may be used in
criminal proceedings and are irrelevant as to the scope of this article.
10. See, e.g., Servotronics, Inc., 954 F.3d at 215-16; Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., 939 F.3d at 717-18;
contra Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 694-95; Hanwei Guo, 965 F.3d at 103.
11. See, e.g., Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 693 (“[T]he word ‘tribunal’ is not defined in the statute, and
dictionary definitions do not unambiguously resolve whether private arbitral panels are included in the
specific sense in which the term is used here.”).
12. See Hanwei Guo, 965 F.3d at 109 (noting that the court’s prior decision in NBC that Section 1782(a) did
not broadly encompass private commercial arbitration was still good law); NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165
F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 882 (5th
Cir. 1999) (stating that other opinions, primarily from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, showed that “not
every conceivable fact-finding or adjudicative body is covered . . . .”); Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 693
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not have enacted a statute providing broader discovery rights to international arbitration
than it would for domestic arbitration cases.13 Finally, the three appellate courts opposed
to Section 1782(a)’s use in private international arbitration all argue Section 1782(a) would
be in direct conflict with Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).14 Meanwhile,
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have constructed logically sound arguments to dismiss each
of these in turn to justify their endorsement of Section 1782(a).15
For the reasons explained in Section Three of this article, the possibility of this
issue coming before the Supreme Court is exceedingly high given the recent conflicting
outcomes of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits.16 If the Supreme Court decides that Section
1782(a)’s “foreign or international tribunals” phrasing does not include the term
arbitration, then participants involved in the international arbitration realm will gain the
ability to block broader discovery.17 However, if the Supreme Court decides Section
1782(a)’s phrasing does apply, then international public policy will be upheld. Despite
these fears that the arbitral system will come to a screeching halt, the process of
international arbitration will carry on like normal.18
(“All definitions agree that the word ‘tribunal’ means ‘a court,’ but some are more expansive, leaving room
for both competing interpretations”).
13. See NBC 165 F.3d at 191 (noting that allowing large amounts of discovery to occur in private arbitration
of “foreign tribunals” as compared to the breadcrumbs of discovery allowed for domestic arbitration would
be “devoid of principle.”); see also Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d at 883 (“It is not likely that Congress would
have chosen to authorize federal courts to assure broader discovery in aid of foreign private arbitration than
is afforded its domestic dispute-resolution counterpart.”); Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 695 (stating it would
be irrational for “litigants in foreign arbitrations [to] . . . have access to much more expansive discovery than
litigants in domestic arbitrations.”).
14. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 188 (noting that if a broad interpretation of Section 1782(a) were adopted the court
would have to decide whether Section 1782(a) or Section 7 of the FAA would be “exclusive,” however, since
the issue wasn’t reached no ruling was made by the court); Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d at 883 (stating “there
is . . . a possibility that Federal Arbitration Act § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1782 conflict . . . .”); Rolls-Royce PLC,
975 F.3d at 695 (“Reading § 1782(a) broadly to apply to all private foreign arbitrations creates a direct
conflict with the [FAA] for this subset of foreign arbitrations.”).
15. See infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
16. Both Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co. out of the Fouth Circuit and Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC
out of the Seventh Circuit stem from the same petitioner. However, the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals have reached drastically different conclusions. The Fourth Circuit held that Section 1782(a) allows
discovery to be compelled in private international arbitration while the Seventh Circuit held it does not. This
creates a large issue because the motion for discovery came from the same private international arbitration
agreement, leaving an unworkable outcome. See Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209 (4th Cir.
2020); Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2020).
17. See generally Elizabeth B. Sandza & Lindsay M. Bethea, U.S. Court Assistance with Foreign Arbitration
Discovery: Should it, Will It, Be Allowed?, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Jul. 30, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-court-assistance-foreign-arbitration-discovery-should-it-will-itbe-allowed.
18. See An Act to establish a Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial
Procedure, 85 P.L. 906, 72 Stat. 1743 (leading up to the 1964 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, Congress
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III.

BRIEF OVERVIEW: WHAT CAUSED THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Pre-Intel Decisions by the Second and Fifth Circuits

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co. was
the first appellate court to conclude that “Congress did not intend for [28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)]
to apply to an arbitral body established by private parties.”19 NBC had entered an
agreement with the broadcast company Azteca that was subject to arbitration of disputes
under the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”).20 After the agreement fell through,
NBC applied for discovery under Section 1782(a), which the district court granted.21
However, on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.22 The court determined that
Section 1782(a)’s use of the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” was ambiguous,
leading it to look to legislative history for a definition.23 The court reasoned that Congress
did not intend for the statute to apply to private arbitration.24 Finally, the appellate court
noted “the type of discovery sought by NBC . . . would undermine one of the significant
advantages of arbitration, and thus arguably conflict with the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration . . . .”25
The next court to make a ruling on Section 1782(a)’s use in private arbitration was
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l.26 In
Biedermann, the Fifth Circuit also reasoned that the term “tribunal” was vague and that

created a commission to “examine judicial assistance and cooperation between the United States and foreign
Countries . . . .”); See also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 248 (2004) (noting
that legislative history shows Congress created the 1958 Committee in response to how quickly transnational
business was growing). Additionally, any worry that permitting discovery under Section 1782(a) will result
in slower arbitration and excess costs fails to consider the discretion provided to district court judges as laid
out in the Supreme Court’s Intel decision. Id. at 262; infra note 34 and accompanying text.
19. NBC, 165 F.3d at 191.
20. See id. at 186.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 191.
23. Id. at 188 (“In our view, the term ‘foreign or international tribunal’ is sufficiently ambiguous that it does
not necessarily include or exclude the arbitral panel at issue here.”).
24. See NBC 165 F.3d at 190 (noting that the court believes Congress would have expressly mentioned
arbitral panels created by private parties if it intended to lend “American judicial assistance”).
25. Id. at 191.
26. See Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d at 880.
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Congress did not intend for it to encompass arbitration.27 Further, the Fifth Circuit noted
that permitting Section 1782(a) to apply to private foreign arbitration would provide
broader discovery in international arbitration than is permitted in domestic arbitration in
the United States.28 For those reasons, the court reversed, leaving the issue largely
undisputed until the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc.29
B. The Supreme Court and Intel
It is important to note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel did not specifically
deal with private foreign international arbitration; rather, it handled an issue arising from a
foreign investigation commission seeking documents through Section 1782(a).30 While the
Court answered three questions in Intel, it was the first that caused the current circuit split
based upon the Court’s interpretation of the word “tribunal.”31 The first question answered
by the Court, and the only one relevant in this article, was whether Section 1782(a)
“contains a foreign-discoverability requirement.”32
On this question, the Supreme Court held that there was no foreign-discoverability
requirement contained in Section 1782(a).33 The Court reasoned that the text of Section
1782(a) did not “limit[] a district court's production-order authority to materials that could
be discovered in the foreign jurisdiction if the materials were located there.”34 The Court
also noted that concerns of equality between litigating parties do not justify the absolute
bar to the discovery process that a foreign-discoverability requirement would impose.35
27. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d at 882 (“[T]he term ‘tribunal’ lacks precision . . . . ‘Tribunal’ has been held
not to include even certain types of fact-finding proceedings . . . .”).
28. See id. at 883.
29. Intel, 542 U.S. at 246.
30. See generally id. at 246-247 (the Supreme Court’s Intel decision dealt with whether Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc. was permitted to seek documents through 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to use in a European antitrust
proceeding it had initiated).
31. Id. at 258 (quoting Smit, International Litigation, supra note 6, at 1026-27) (“‘[t]he term “tribunal” . . .
includes . . . administrative and arbitral tribunals . . . .’”).
32. Id. at 259-60 (“Does § 1782(a) categorically bar a district court from ordering production of documents
when the foreign tribunal or the ‘interested person’ would not be able to obtain the documents if they were
located in the foreign jurisdiction?”).
33. See id. at 253.
34. Intel, 542 U.S. at 260.
35. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 262 (reasoning that concerns of equality among parties are remedied by the district
courts’ wide-ranging discretion, which would permit it to “condition relief upon that person's reciprocal
exchange of information.” Additionally, the court notes that a foreign tribunal would still maintain the
freedom to reject any information gained by a party under Section 1782(a) stating “foreign tribunal[‘s] can
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Additionally, the Court made two points before laying out the factors for a district
court to consider when receiving a request under Section 1782(a). First, the Court noted
that district courts may lend assistance in discovering relevant materials to the complainant
but are not required to.36 Second, the Court expressly rebuked the contention that materials
sought should only be permitted for discovery if discovery would be allowed in an
equivalent domestic proceeding.37 Finally, the Court laid out the factors for a district court
to consider when determining whether to permit a complainant to proceed under Section
1782(a). The first factor to consider is whether “the person from whom discovery is sought
is a participant in the foreign proceeding . . . the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as
apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter
arising abroad.”38 The second factor to contemplate is the “nature of the foreign tribunal,
[and] the character of the proceedings . . . .”39 Third, the courts should examine whether
the request of documents through Section 1782 is “an attempt to circumvent . . . proofgathering restrictions . . . .”40 The fourth factor lower courts should consider is that requests
which are extremely burdensome “may be rejected or trimmed.”41
C. Post-Intel Decisions:
1. The Sixth and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal Go Against the Grain
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel, there was a fifteen-year period of
silence on whether Section 1782(a) applied to private international arbitration. The first
court to add to the circuit split was the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Abdul Latif
Jameel Transportation Co. v. FedEx Corp. decision.42 In Abdul Latif Jameel
Transportation Co., the dispute was triggered by allegations of material misrepresentations
within an international contract, leading to arbitration proceedings.43 Since FedEx
place conditions on [their] acceptance of the information to maintain whatever measure of parity it concludes
is appropriate.”).
36. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 255 (“The statute authorizes, but does not require, a federal district court to provide
assistance to a complainant . . . .”).
37. See id. at 263 (noting that Section 1782(a) does not call for this comparison to be made, and that
“[c]omparisons of that order can be fraught with danger”).
38. Id. at 264.
39. Id.
40. Intel, 542 U.S. at 265.
41. Id.
42. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., 939 F.3d at 714-16.
43. See generally id. at 714-15.
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Corporation is headquartered in the U.S., Abdul Latif Jameel Transport Company (“ALJ”)
filed for discovery under Section 1782(a), which the district court denied.44
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the
arbitral panel was a “tribunal” under Section 1782(a).45 The court reasoned that, since
Section 1782(a) was non-mandatory, it did not detract from the speedy dispute resolution
sought by parties in arbitration.46 The Sixth Circuit then determined that the legal use of
the term “tribunal” supported a broad interpretation and that the congressional context of
Section 1782(a) did not suggest otherwise.47
Several months after the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals joined the Sixth Circuit in holding that Section 1782(a) encompasses international
arbitral panels in Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co. (“Servotronics I”).48 Servotronics I
involved a dispute over a settlement resulting from a faulty Servotronics part within a
Rolls-Royce engine that caused damage to a Boeing aircraft.49 Unable to reach an
agreement, the parties’ arbitration clause took effect, which was followed by Servotronics
filing for discovery under Section 1782(a) “to obtain testimony” from several employees
who were located where the accident had occurred.50 However, the district court rejected
Servotronics’ application for aid under Section 1782(a).51
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court holding “the
UK arbitral panel [that] convened to address the dispute . . . is a ‘foreign or international
tribunal’ under § 1782(a) and . . . the district court has authority to provide . . .
assistance . . . .”52 The court rejected several arguments put forward by Boeing, the first of
which was that “tribunal” only included “entit[ies] that exercise[] government-conferred
authority.”53 The court reasoned, based on Congress’s enactment of the FAA and judicial
support for arbitration, that arbitration is considered a “government-conferred authority”

44. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., 939 F.3d at 716.
45. Id. at 716.
46. See id. 730 (“[A] district court can limit or reject ‘unduly intrusive or burdensome’ discovery requests.”).
47. See id. at 719-23 (following thorough analysis of legislative history and definitions the court concluded
“the text, context, and structure of § 1782(a) provide no reason to doubt that the word ‘tribunal’ includes
private commercial arbitral panels established pursuant to contract . . . .”).
48. See Servotronics, Inc., 954 F.3d at 216.
49. See id. at 210.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 210-11.
52. Id. at 216.
53. Servotronics, Inc., 954 F.3d at 213.

7

within the United States.54 Further, the court reasoned that Section 1782(a)’s application
would not affect the core advantages parties bargain for in arbitration agreements since
discovery under Section 1782(a) is far less broad than what the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would permit.55 Finally, the court addressed the argument that Section 1782(a)
would effectively undermine the FAA by permitting broader discovery.56 In response, the
court stated that under Section 1782(a), “a district court functions effectively as a surrogate
for a foreign tribunal . . . . When viewed in this light, the district court functions no
differently than . . . an American arbitral panel.”57
2. The Second Circuit Doubles Down and The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals Decides Against Section 1782(a)
July of 2020 provided the Second Circuit an opportunity to re-establish and
strengthen its position on Section 1782(a) in Hanwei Guo v. Deutsche Bank Sec.58 In
Hanwei Guo, the Second Circuit primarily discussed how their opinion in NBC was still
good law considering the Supreme Court’s Intel decision.59 Here, the Second Circuit
reasoned that the refusal in NBC to “read such a sweeping expansion into the statute in the
absence of clear statutory language . . . or congressional intent [was] consistent with . . .
Intel.”60

54. Servotronics, Inc., 954 F.3d at 214 (after describing the overall nature of the FAA’s enactment the court
summarizes stating “arbitration in the United States is a congressionally endorsed and regulated process that
is judicially supervised. . . . Thus, contrary to [the] . . . assertion that arbitration is not a product of
‘government-conferred authority,’ under U.S. law, it clearly is.”).
55. Id. at 215 (rebutting the argument that discovery under Section 1782(a) would strip arbitration of its
benefits the court stated, “the process must be administered in the discretion of the district court — not the
parties, as is the case in discovery — to assist in the limited role of receiving evidence for use in the foreign
tribunal proceeding.”).
56. See id. (“Boeing . . . expresses concern that applying §1782(a) . . . would ‘create a conflict with the FAA
by authorizing discovery that the FAA does not contemplate,’ . . . . Specifically, . . . that applying §1782(a)
would broaden ‘discovery’ or access to information in foreign arbitrations to an extent not available in U.S.
arbitrations . . . .”).
57. Id. at 215 (emphasis in original).
58. See generally Hanwei Guo, 965 F.3d at 104-05 (stating that the courts previous holding in, NBC,165
F.3d, is still good law and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
542 U.S. 241 (2004) did not overrule the court’s prior opinion).
59. See id. at 104-07 (holding that the court’s prior decision in NBC, 165 F.3d was not overturned).
60. Id. at 106; but see Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals:
Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J. INT'I L. & COM 1, 5 (1998) (“The substitution
of the word ‘tribunal’ for ‘court’ was deliberate, for the drafters wanted to make the assistance provided for
available to all bodies with adjudicatory functions. Clearly, private arbitral tribunals come within the term
the drafters used.”).
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion about Section 1782(a)
dealing with the same factual background as Servotronics I. This dispute arose from
Servotronics applying for Section 1782(a) to a district court in Illinois, where Boeing is
headquartered.61 While the subpoena sought by Servotronics was initially granted, RollsRoyce interjected and the district court granted a motion to quash the subpoena on the
grounds that Section 1782(a) was not permitted for use in a private foreign arbitration
setting.62
Servotronics appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
judgment, joining the Second and Fifth Circuits in concluding that “§ 1782(a) does not
authorize the district courts to compel discovery for use in private foreign arbitrations.”63
The court began by examining the definition of the term “tribunal” before determining
dictionaries to be of no aid and turning to statutory context.64 The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that Congress’s creation of a 1958 committee, tasked to investigate judicial cooperation
between the U.S. and other countries,65 supported a narrow interpretation of the phrase
“foreign or international tribunal.”66 Finally, the court discussed how interpreting Section
1782(a) to apply to private arbitration would permit unfairly expansive discovery when
compared with domestic arbitration,67 and place it in conflict with the FAA.68
61. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 691.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 696.
64. Id. at 692-95.
65. See id. at 694 (“The Commission shall investigate and study existing practices of judicial assistance and
cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with a view to achieving improvements.”)
(quoting Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743, 1743).
66. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 694-95 (noting that the instructions for creating the 1958 committee did not
include “recommend[ing] improvements in judicial assistance to private foreign arbitration.” The court then
reasoned that because the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” is used in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1696 and 1781,
which “are matters of comity between governments” this lends aid to the court’s interpretation that Section
1782(a)’s use of the phrase should not encompass arbitration so as to be in harmony with these statutes).
67. See id. at 695 (“It's hard to conjure a rationale for giving parties to private foreign arbitrations such broad
access to federal-court discovery assistance in the United States while precluding such discovery assistance
for litigants in domestic arbitrations.”); but see Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241,
246 (2004) (“The Court . . . rejects [the] suggestion that a § 1782(a) applicant must show that United States
law would allow discovery in domestic litigation analogous to the foreign proceeding. Section 1782 is a
provision for assistance to tribunals abroad. It does not direct United States courts to engage in comparative
analysis to determine whether analogous proceedings exist here. Comparisons of that order can be fraught
with danger.”) (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 695-96 (stating that “the FAA permits the arbitration panel—but not the parties—to [seek
discovery] . . . .” and that because “the FAA applies to some foreign arbitrations under implementing
legislation for the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards . . . .” a broad
reading would conflict with the FAA) (emphasis added).
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IV.

WHY SECTION 1782(A) SHOULD APPLY TO FOREIGN ARBITRATION

Given that some of the core benefits of arbitration sought by parties are lower costs
and expeditious proceedings,69 it is understandable that concerns arise when the possibility
of expansive discovery in arbitration is mentioned. This section of the article will break
down the reasoning of the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. The section begins with a
discussion on why these Circuits have misinterpreted the statutory history regarding
Section 1782(a) and laying out how the phrase “foreign or international tribunal”
encompasses arbitral tribunals. Next, a rebuttal will be provided for the arguments that
arbitral panels’ inclusion as a tribunal will cause unequal discovery between domestic and
international arbitration. Finally, this section will conclude by explaining that Section
1782(a)’s encompassing of arbitration panels aligns with the emphatic federal policy
favoring arbitration and will have no detrimental effect on the operation of private
international arbitration.
A. The Second Fifth and Seventh Circuits Misinterpret Statutory History
When the text of a statute is unclear, courts will engage in statutory interpretation
in an attempt to decode Congress’s intent at the point in time it enacted the law.70
Discerning the true meaning of any statute that is over half a century old is not an easy
task, which may explain why the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits all concluded that the
legislative history showed Section 1782(a) was not meant to apply to private foreign
arbitration.71 However, despite the inability of these courts to come to a definite conclusion
on the legislative history, they all chose to gloss over one important scholar, Hans Smit.72
69. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 4 (“[A]rbitral adjudication . . . is expeditious, efficient, economical,
effective, and enforceable.”).
70. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co.,939 F.3d at 717 (6th Cir. 2019) (“‘In determining the meaning of a
statutory provision, we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning. . . .’ And
ordinary meaning is to be determined retrospectively . . . .”) (quoting Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S.
Ct. 594, 603(2018)).
71. See NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding Section 1782 did not encompass
private arbitration after admitting that the legislative history and committees noted the “word ‘tribunal’ is
used to make it clear that assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional courts . . . .”) (internal
citations omitted); Hanwei Guo, 965 F.3d at 102 ; Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d (after reviewing legislative
history “elect[ing] to follow the Second Circuit[] . . . .”); Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 695 (concluding
legislative history suggests a narrow reading of Section 1782).
72. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190, n. 6 (acknowledging that the Senate Report relied on Hans Smit’s work in
1962, and that Hans Smit also released a work later in life where he discussed the congressional intent at the
time, but declined to find it persuasive); Biederman Int’l, 168 F.3d at 882, n. 5 (stating “[t]here is no
contemporaneous evidence that Congress contemplated extending § 1782 to the then-novel arena of
international commercial arbitration,” but then commenting in note five that Hans Smit, one of the individuals
who helped the Committee draft changes to Section 1782, recounted that “private commercial arbitrations
are within §1782.”); Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 696 (writing off the Supreme Court’s own noting of Hans
Smit’s inclusion of arbitral tribunals within Section 1782 because it occurred in a “explanatory parenthetical”
and “[t]here is no indication that ‘arbitral tribunals’ includes private arbitral tribunals.”) (emphasis in
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Hans Smit is perhaps the most insightful source to discover the legislative intent of
the 1964 amendments to Section 1782(a).73 While it is conceded that secondary authorities
should be given less weight than that which Congress explicitly states or what a court rules
are the proper interpretations of the law, the disagreement over Section 1782(a) presents a
unique case.74 Further, while Hans Smit’s opinions on their own likely are not dispositive
of the issue, the Supreme Court’s reference to Hans Smit’s work should add considerable
weight to them. While it is true that the Court referred to Hans Smit in a parenthetical
explanation, this cursory glance is not nearly enough to close the investigation.75 Intel was
a Supreme Court decision written by Justice Ginsburg, the same Justice who had previously
referred to Hans Smit as the “dominant drafter” of Section 1782 and its amendments.76
Therefore, it seems likely that the Supreme Court, having relied on Hans Smit’s
interpretations previously, would give deference to them again should the occasion arise.
Next, the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” should be interpreted to
encompass private international arbitration for two reasons. First, having established Hans
Smit’s importance in aiding Congress’s 1964 amendments to Section 1782, his comments
should be viewed as closely aligned with congressional intent at the time. This point is
further exemplified by Hans Smit’s law review article published just a year after the 1964
amendments, which states “[t]he term tribunal encompasses all bodies that have
adjudicatory power, and is intended to include . . . arbitral tribunals or single arbitrators.”77
Additionally, Hans Smit’s immediate and detailed release of comments and background
purpose on the 1964 amendments strikes directly against the Second Circuit’s claim that
“Professor Smit's recent article does not purport to rely upon any special knowledge
concerning legislative intent . . . .”78 Second, it is important to note that Congress removed
original); but see CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 2 (“[A]rbitration is generally private and confidential.
Arbitral proceedings are not open to the public . . . . The recourse to arbitration, therefore allows commercial
parties to maintain their commercial reputation . . . .”) (emphasis added).
73. See Hans Smit, Article: American Judicial Assistance to International Arbitral Tribunals, 8 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 153, 154 (1997) (“My role in the development of the measures that were adopted by Congress
has led both courts and commentators to place heavy reliance on my published writings in this area.”).
74. The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits all refuse to provide any authoritative weight to Hans Smit’s
work or comments on the Amendments to Section 1782(a). Accord Biederman Int’l, 168 F.3d at 882, n.5.
Additionally, the Second Circuit notion that Hans Smit did not adopt his opinion on whether “tribunal” is
included within Section 1782 for nearly three decades is patently false. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190, n.6. Hans
Smit had supported this assertion in his 1965 Columbia law review article which states, “The new legislation
also authorizes assistance in aid of international arbitral tribunals.” Hans Smit, International arbitration, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1015, n.73.
75. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 258.
76. In Re Letter of Request From the Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom (Ward), 870 F. 2d
686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Smit, supra note 73, at 154.
77. Smit, International Litigation, supra note 5, at 1021.
78. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190, n.6; see also Smit, supra note 73, at 154.

11

restrictive verbiage when making their 1964 amendments to Section 1782.79 While it is
true that not every deleted word was explained, many of the removals were explained in a
Senate Report after the Section 1782 amendments became law.80 With such broad language
being recognized by the then-contemporary Senate, the legislative history seems to suggest
that arbitral tribunals would be encompassed within Section 1782.81 It would be quite a
discrepancy for Congress to specifically note that it did not want the proceedings confined
to conventional courts only to then exclude a quasi-judicial proceeding such as
arbitration.82
B. Irrelevant Discovery Arguments and a Harmonious Relationship with the FAA
It is undisputed that there are major differences between domestic arbitration within
the United States and international commercial arbitration.83 In fact, these differences can
be rather substantial, ranging from initiation of arbitration to discovery.84 These differences
should alert the courts to the notion that, while international arbitration is similar to its
domestic cousin, it is in a different category, and the two should not be compared for a
variety of reasons.
The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have all relied heavily on the notion that
permitting Section 1782(a) to encompass private international arbitration would unfairly
permit more discovery to occur than is allowed in domestic arbitration.85 However, the
79. See Intel 542 U.S. at 248-49 (noting that “Congress deleted the words ‘in any judicial proceeding pending
in any court in a foreign country,’ and replaced them with the phrase ‘in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal.’”).
80. See id. at 249 (discussing how the Senate Report “explains that Congress introduced the word ‘tribunal’
to ensure that ‘assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional courts,’ but extends also to
‘administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings.’”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1964)).
81. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., 939 F.3d at 728 (“The facts on which the legislative history is most
clear are that the substitution of ‘tribunal’ for ‘judicial proceeding’ broadened the scope of the statute . . . .”).
82. See id. (“[T]he legislative history does not indicate that the expansion stopped short of private arbitration.
. . .”); Intel 542 U.S. at 249.
83. See generally Daniel B. Swaja, Global Construction Disputes – Basics on U.S. Domestic Versus
International Arbitration (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publi
cations/under_construction/2019/spring/domestic-versus-international-arbitration/. This article highlights
the primary differences between domestic and international arbitration ranging from cost savings being
magnified, to different discovery processes. To remain transparent, it is conceded by this author that this
source notes “[d]iscovery tends to be much more limited in international arbitration than in U.S. domestic
arbitration.” However, extending the discovery aid of Section 1782 will still comport with established
standards and is further discussed below.
84. See Albert Bates Jr. & R. Zachary Torres-Fowler, Internationalizing Domestic Arbitration: How
International Arbitration Practices Can Improve Domestic Construction Arbitration, 74 DIS. RES. J., no. 3,
Jun. 2020, at 8-16, 22-26.
85. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 191 (“[B]road discovery . . . before ‘foreign or international’ private arbitrators
would stand in stark contrast to . . . domestic arbitration panels . . . .”); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann
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rationale put forward by the appellate courts is explicitly rebutted by the Supreme Court in
Intel.86 The Supreme Court went so far as to warn the lower courts that “[c]omparisons of
that order can be fraught with danger.”87 Such comparisons are improper primarily due to
the extensive differences that typically exist between international and domestic
arbitration. For example, it is common for international arbitration to be a front-loaded
process with specific pleadings that are more customary in civil law.88 Furthermore, the
very nature of “discovery” in international arbitration is typically a limited process.89 The
Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits would all likely consider the limited nature of
discovery in international arbitration to aid their reasoning.90
However, the lack of allowable discovery should begin to ease appellate court fears
that international arbitration will allow parties to engage in excessively more discovery
than domestic arbitration. This argument is bolstered by the fact that the initial pleadings
phase of international arbitration allows disputing parties to pinpoint exactly what
documents they need to obtain, if any.91 Should the parties seek aid under Section 1782(a),
it will likely only be to obtain previously identified documents or witness statements.92
Thus, the suggestion by the Second and Fifth Circuits that parties will self-destruct into
overindulgent discovery-seeking saboteurs if Section 1782(a) were read to encompass
international arbitration, does not seem likely to occur.93
Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999) (“It is not likely that Congress . . . authorize[d] federal courts to assure
broader discovery in aid of foreign private arbitration than is afforded its domestic dispute-resolution
counterpart.”); Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 695 (stating it would be irrational to give “private foreign
arbitrations . . . broad access to federal-court discovery . . . while precluding such discovery assistance . . . in
domestic arbitrations”).
86. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 263 (noting “[Section 1782(a)] does not direct . . . courts to engage in comparative
analysis to determine whether analogous proceedings exist here.”); see also Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co.,
939 F.3d at 729.
87. Intel, 542 U.S. at 263.
88. See Bates Jr., supra note 84, at 15 (noting that early “particularized pleadings” typically negate the need
for long excessive discovery that can be found in regular litigation, and sometimes in domestic U.S.
arbitration).
89. Id. at 23. (“[G]iven the prominent influence of civil law legal traditions in international arbitration, it is
well accepted, . . . that expansive document disclosure (like that seen in the United States) is inappropriate in
international arbitration.”); See also Swaja, supra note 83 (“Discovery tends to be much more limited in
international arbitration than in U.S. domestic arbitration.”).
90. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
91. See Bates Jr., supra note 84, at 15 (“[B]ecause the parties have already laid out their cases in detail and
supplied much of their supporting evidence, the parties are typically better able to understand what the crucial
issues . . . are and what additional documentary evidence they require. . . .”).
92. Id.
93. Compare NBC, 165 F.3d at 191 (implying that parties to arbitration will take advantage of and destroy
the benefits arbitration stating that, “[o]pening the door to the type of discovery sought . . . would undermine
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C. Including Arbitration Under Section 1782(a) Comports with the Emphatic
Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration
Finally, for any rule or interpretation of arbitration to stand the test of time, it is
important that it aligns with the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration. The Second
Circuit has reasoned that permitting private international arbitral tribunals to seek
discovery under Section 1782(a) would “conflict with the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”94 However, the Second Circuit’s
contention does not withstand scrutiny when examined next to the Supreme Court’s history
of favoring arbitration, or while examining Section 1782(a) within the scope of the
Supreme Court’s Intel decision.
To begin, it may be said that actively attempting to narrow Section 1782(a) is a
direct strike against the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration.95 Thus, the arguments
by the appellate courts, such as broader discovery being permitted than in domestic
arbitration, seem hostile to international arbitration,96 a procedure with major differences
from its domestic counterpart.97 Next, the Supreme Court’s factors in Intel aid the idea that
Section 1782(a)’s inclusion of arbitral tribunals furthers the policy favoring arbitration.98
The first factor comports with ensuring the arbitral process can run successfully because,
one of the significant advantages of arbitration[] . . . .”); and Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d at 883 (“Empowering
arbitrators or, worse, the parties, in private international disputes to seek ancillary discovery through the
federal courts does not benefit the arbitration process. . . . Resort[ing] to § 1782 in the teeth of such
agreements suggests a party's attempt to manipulate United States court processes for tactical advantage.”);
with Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 262 (noting that should the district court permit discovery under Section 1782(a)
“the foreign tribunal . . . [could] place conditions on its acceptance of the information to maintain whatever
measure of parity it concludes is appropriate.”); and Smit, supra note 73, at 156 (“[I]nternational tribunals
are . . . free to shape their procedures. . . . This means . . . [the parties] can ask for assistance from an American
court only when the arbitral tribunal has ruled this to be permissible.”).
94. NBC, 165 F.3d at 191.
95. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (“Congress directed courts to abandon their
hostility and instead treat arbitration agreements as ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.’ . . . The Act, this
Court has said, establishes ‘a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’”).
96. See Smit, supra note 73, at 161 (“[P]recluding any recourse to Section 1782 by a private foreign or
international arbitral tribunal reflects an attitude hostile to international arbitration that is at odds with the
legislatively and judicially repeatedly expressed favor of arbitration as a socially desirable alternative form
of dispute settlement.”).
97. Supra note 83 and accompanying text.
98. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264-65 (“First, when the person from whom discovery is sought is a
participant in the foreign proceeding . . . the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily
is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising abroad. . . . Second, . . . a court . . . may
take into account the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings . . ., and the receptivity
of the foreign government or the court or agency . . . . [Third], a district court [may] consider whether the §
1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent . . . proof-gathering restrictions . . . [Fourth], unduly
intrusive or burdensome requests may be rejected or trimmed.”).
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as the Court states, “nonparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the foreign
tribunal's jurisdictional reach; hence, their evidence, available in the United States, may be
unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid.”99 The second factor of Intel further ensures the policy
favoring arbitration is upheld because it permits the district courts to look to the type of
proceeding before it while considering how to apply Section 1782(a), rather than being
forced to blindly grant all requests.100 Intel’s third factor provides the district court further
discretion by allowing the court to examine whether the requesting party is trying to
undermine the proceeding it is involved in, and if so, the court may deny the request.101
This allows the arbitral process to be preserved by preventing parties from engaging in acts
that may diminish the reliability of arbitration. Finally, Intel’s fourth factor directly aligns
with the idea that arbitration is meant to be an expedited cost-effective process by
permitting courts to outright deny requests that are “unduly intrusive or burdensome.”102
V. CONCLUSION
Arbitration, whether domestic or international, is supposed to be an expeditious
cost-effective procedure when compared to traditional litigation. Nevertheless, these
attributes still apply when reading Section 1782(a) to include private international
commercial arbitration. As discussed, Section 1782(a) has an immense number of
safeguards ranging from the discretion of district courts in approving the request to the
parties’ own reluctance to strike against the arbitral panel. Further, having access to
documents potentially guaranteeing accurate results within the arbitral process is
imperative if companies and parties are to continue utilizing arbitration to resolve their
disputes. The ability to block relevant documents from being discovered through Section
1782(a) simply because it will permit more discovery than is allowed in domestic
arbitration not only has nationalistic undertones but will also end up undermining the
national policy favoring arbitration that the Supreme Court has sought to bolster. In closing,
the legislative history, congressional intent, and Supreme Court precedent in Intel all
support Section 1782 permitting discovery in private international arbitration.

99. Intel, 542 U.S. at 264.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 265.
102. Id.
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